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STICKS AND STONES: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND CAMPUS SPEECH
CODES
LEE ANN RABE*

"The only effective method of altering a world view that is
deemed pernicious is to provide a persuasive response-that is,
'more speech.' 'Shut up!' is not a persuasive response."'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past few decades, American universities have
experienced an increasingly diverse population in terms of race,
gender, religious belief, sexual orientation, and other demographic
categories. Few would argue that increasing diversity on the
country's college campuses is anything but beneficial. Students
from a wide variety of backgrounds can provide a wide range of
viewpoints that add to the marketplace of ideas exchanged in the
university setting. In turn, this open exchange can lead to
increased understanding and tolerance in our society.
Yet, this increasing diversity also brings with it the potential
for increasing fetters on the constitutional rights of students. In
the interest of providing a safe and supportive atmosphere for all
students, regardless of their background, many university
administrators have adopted some form of campus speech code for
their schools. Such speech codes are aimed at preventing the use
of hurtful, derogatory terms to denigrate the race, ethnicity, or
gender of students attending that university. Administrators seek
to protect their students from the offensive words that may be
directed at them by their more intolerant counterparts. No matter
how noble the goal, however, the cure may be worse than the
disease.
* Lee Ann Rabe: B.A., in English, The Ohio State University; M.A., in
Journalism, The Ohio State University; J.D., The Ohio State University
Moritz College of Law, Class of 2003. I dedicate this article to my husband,
Bryan Bowen, who has provided much appreciated support. I would also like
to thank L. Camille Hebert for her support and guidance in developing this
article.
1. Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment
Harassmentand the FirstAmendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 550 (1991).
2. Some commentators have suggested that revealing these attitudes,
rather than forcing them underground, is the best path to eventually
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Campus speech codes present both constitutional and policy
difficulties.3 Part II of this Article examines the Supreme Court's
recent jurisprudence concerning content-based regulation of
speech. Part III considers the additional constitutional problems
posed by overly broad and vague speech regulations. With this
legal background, Part IV examines the policy considerations and
additional case law that suggests speech regulations adopted by
universities are inappropriate.

II. REGULATION BY CONTENT AND THE "FIGHTING WORDS"
DOCTRINE

First Amendment speech protection clashes with the desire of
university administrators to provide a safe and supportive
learning environment for all students, making the creation and
maintenance of speech codes problematic. The Supreme Court has
historically been hostile to content-based regulations of speech.4
Regulating speech on the basis of what is said, or the message that
is communicated,, strikes at the very heart of the free speech
protections guaranteed in the Constitution. Speech generally
cannot be prohibited based solely on the regulator's dislike for the
ideas expressed, much to the dismay of administrators seeking to
ensure civility among the university's students. Speech codes,
which are by definition content-based, raise constitutional red
flags when the ban might also sweep in protected speech alongside
unprotected speech.
A First Amendment exception might have provided solace for
university administrators. While retaining its hostility to contentbased regulation, the Supreme Court has established a limited
number of categories of speech that receive little or no protection
The Court
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.'
eliminating them through education and discussion. See, e.g., Charles R.
Calleros, Paternalism, Counterspeech, and Campus Hate-Speech Codes: A
Reply to Delgado and Yun, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1249, 1271-72 (1995) (arguing
that rules against hateful speech deprive universities of information about
discrimination).
3. The arguments in this article apply solely to public universities, which
may be seen as state actors and therefore subject to the restrictions imposed
by the Constitution. Private universities have much greater latitude to enact
and enforce speech codes for their own campuses. Despite the lack of a
constitutional barrier, however, private universities might rightfully be wary
of enacting regulations that would not be upheld at a public school.
4. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (holding that a prohibition of discussions of
controversial issues in utility bills violates the First and Fourteenth
Amendments).
5. These categories include obscenity, libel/slander, profanity, and
"fighting words." Other than "fighting words" and obscenity, this two-class
treatment of speech has largely been overturned; even the two remaining
categories have been limited by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
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established the first of these categories, "fighting words," in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.6 While recognizing freedom of
speech and freedom of the press as "fundamental personal rights
and liberties which are protected... from invasion by state
action," the Court also recognized that these rights were not
absolute.7 The Court defined "fighting words" as those words that
would be understood by the average man to provoke the listener to
fight, and those words "which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."8 The Court
considered such words to have "such slight social value as a step to
truth" that they were outside the protections granted by the
Constitution.9 After Chaplinsky, it was understood that speech
could be regulated and prohibited if it fell within the category of
"fighting words."
Administrators found the "fighting words" doctrine to be just
the First Amendment exception needed to enact speech codes.
After all, they wished to prohibit the type of speech that caused
injury to those it was directed towards. Since the creation of the
"fighting words" category in Chaplinsky, however, the Court has
been reluctant to expand the doctrine and in fact has limited the
applicability of the exception through subsequent decisions. The
Court has not explicitly overruled Chaplinsky, choosing instead to
strike down "fighting words" laws on overbreadth and vagueness
grounds" or by stating that the interests the state sought to serve
were not sufficiently compelling to overcome the First Amendment
protection."
For example, in Cohen v. California," the Court
narrowed "fighting words" to words clearly "directed to the person
of the hearer" or words intended to provoke an immediate, violent

6. 315 U.S. 568, 572 n.3 (1942). Chaplinksy was arrested for violating a
state statute prohibiting speech that was "offensive, derisive, or annoying,"
including "any offensive or derisive name[s]." He called the complainant a
"God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist." Id. at 569.
7. Id. at 571.
8. Id. at 572-73.
9. Id. at 572 (stating that the interest in protecting such speech was
"clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality").
10. See discussion infra Part III.

11. "Fighting words" were originally thought not to have any First
Amendment protection because of their low or non-existent social value.
However, much of the speech that falls under the "fighting words" doctrine can
be considered to have at least some social value. "The First Amendment does
not permit society to require that speakers have socially useful messages, and
that is why most hate speech must be protected." RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE
SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 166 (1992).

12. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Paul Cohen walked into a courthouse wearing a
jacket with the slogan "Fuck the Draft" emblazoned on the back. He was
arrested and convicted under a statute prohibiting "offensive conduct." Id. at
16-17.
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reaction. 3 According to the Court in Cohen, in order for speech to
fall into the category of "fighting words," the speaker has to intend
to provoke a hostile response from his or her listeners.'" The
speech must also present a "clear and present danger" of
provoking that response, rather than some more attenuated idea
of potentially offending a listener."
The evolution of a narrow definition for "fighting words" may
make a real world application of the doctrine extremely difficult,
at least in a campus speech code setting. Only words that clearly
incite listeners to immediate violence will fall within the category
and therefore lose First Amendment protection. 6 Without a clear
delineation of what is prohibited speech, both to protect as much
speech as possible and to give notice of what speech constitutes a
violation, the Court has been extremely reluctant to permit such
The conflict between the narrow scope of the
prohibitions.
"fighting words" doctrine and the wider range of speech university
administrators seek to prohibit makes the possibility of a clear
delineation unlikely.
This reluctance to place speech outside the protection of the
First Amendment reflects both distaste for content-based
regulation and an unwillingness to criminalize speech just because
of the listeners' reactions. 7 Before the Court would hold that
speech is within the doctrine, and therefore due a lesser level of
protection, it requires the State to carefully consider whether the
speech prohibited can be reasonably perceived as "a direct

13. Id. at 20 (observing that no one who saw Cohen's jacket reacted
violently and that there was no showing that he intended to provoke such a
reaction).
14. Id. at 23. The Cohen Court stated:
We have been shown no evidence that substantial numbers of citizens
are standing ready to strike out physically at whoever may assault their.

sensibilities with execrations like that uttered by Cohen ...The
argument amounts to little more than the self-defeating proposition that
to avoid physical censorship of one who has not sought to provoke such a
the States may more appropriately effectuate that
response..,
censorship themselves.

Id.
This standard established by the Court suggests that the test from
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), requiring incitement to immediate
violence, will apply in "fighting words" cases.
15. Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447-48.
16. The incitement to violence by the speaker must be aimed at a third
party; a hostile reaction from the crowd toward the speaker is not sufficient to
constitute the type of imminent violence anticipated by the Court. See, e.g.,
Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992)
(stating that "[sipeech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can be
punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob").
17. RONALD D. ROTUNDA, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw SUBSTANCE

AND PROCEDURE § 20.40 (3d ed. 1999).
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personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs."18 While
this definition might cover an extremely small subset of the speech
that university administrators seek to prohibit, it certainly could
not be stretched to cover it all. 9
Two more recent examples of the Court's reluctance to apply
the "fighting words" doctrine are contained in United States v.
Eichmann ° and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.2 In Eichmann, the
Court refused to apply the doctrine to a federal statute banning
flag burning.22 The Court instead declared the speech to be
protected, despite noting that "the desecration of the flag is deeply
offensive to many. But the same might be said, for example, of
virulent ethnic and racial epithets... vulgar repudiations of the
draft... and scurrilous caricatures. " ' The explicit mention of
ethnic and racial epithets in conjunction with flag burning, which
the Court was upholding as protected speech, suggested that such
epithets might also be protected.
The Court further limited the potential reach of the "fighting
words" doctrine in Hustler Magazine, stating that emotional
impact or "outrageousness" was not a sufficient ground for
banning speech.24 These and other decisions provide little solace to
18. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989). The Court overturned the
defendant's conviction for burning the American flag, stating that the
expression at question did not fall into the narrow category of "fighting words."

Id.
19. Id. at 409. For example, a public university might be able to prohibit
the use of certain epithets, on the grounds that they would provoke the
reasonable listener into a violent response. However, the epithets would need
to be directed at an individual, profanity scrawled on a bathroom wall would
probably not suffice as a "direct personal insult." Id. at 398. Also, the
university could probably not ban, for example, requests for sexual acts, as
such speech would not reasonably be seen as "a direct personal insult or an
invitation to exchange fisticuffs," no matter how crudely stated. Id.
20. United States v. Eichmann, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
21. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
22. Eichmann, 496 U.S. at 319. The Court stated that "[i]f there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Id. (citing Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414).
23. Id. at 318-19 (stating that "[t]hat the air may at times seem filled with
verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength ... so
long as the means are peaceful, the communication need not meet standards of
acceptability").
24. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 55-56. The Court recognized that:
"[olutrageousness" in the area of political and social discourse has an
inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose
liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the
basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An "outrageousness"
standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages
to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse
emotional impact on the audience.
Id. (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886. 910 (1982)
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university administrators seeking to enforce a level of civility on
their campuses. If "virulent ethnic and racial epithets" cannot be
prohibited through a speech code, it is unlikely that other, more
neutral speech can be proscribed.
In 1992, the Court articulated additional restrictions on the
"fighting words" doctrine. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 25 a divided
Court 26 struck down a Minnesota statute prohibiting expression
that "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or gender." 2' The state sought to justify
the statute on the "fighting words" doctrine claiming that such
expression had so little value that it could be prohibited.' The
majority, however, held that the statute was "underbroad": that is,
it included some words that might provoke anger or retaliation but
not others.29 The content of the speech, whether it involved race,
color, or one of the other listed discriminatory bases, was the basis
for determining whether it was prohibited."0 The majority found
this content-based regulation unacceptable, even assuming that
the speech regulated fell under the "fighting words" doctrine. 1
"Fighting words" can be regulated, according to the Court, not
because of the message they send, but due to the method in which
it is sent.32 The majority in R.A.V. declared fighting words to be a
"nonspeech" element of communication and thus outside the scope
(writing "[sipeech does not lose its protected character... simply because it
may embarrass others or coerce them into action"); FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978)
[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient
reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives
offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional
protection. For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the
government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (stating "It is firmly settled
that ... the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because
the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers").
25. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
26. See id. at 381-82 (striking down the Minnesota ordinance). The Court,
however, was split five to four over the proper rationale for the outcome. Id. at
378.
27. Id. at 380.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 391-92.
Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Thomas, Souter, and
Kennedy comprised the majority. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion.
The concurring Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Stevens, rejected
the "underbroad" argument stated by the majority. Instead, they would have
struck down the statute on the grounds that it was overbroad. See Part III of
this Article for a fuller explanation of the concurring rationale.
30. Id. at 384.
31. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386 (stating that "[tihe government may not
regulate use based on hostility, or favoritism, towards the underlying message
expressed"). The majority further stated that the State is in fact engaging in
viewpoint discrimination, even beyond content discrimination. Id. at 391.
32. Id. at 385-86.
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of the First Amendment. As it stood, the Minnesota statute
prohibited speech involving race, color, creed, religion, or gender,
but did not prohibit other "[d]isplays containing abusive invective,
no matter how vicious or severe."" The majority said that this
content discrimination was unacceptable.'
The majority
delineated two exceptions to this rule: first, certain speech might
be prohibited if the "basis for the content discrimination consists
entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech is
proscribable," and second, if the subclass of speech is associated
with "secondary effects" that the government is attempting to
prevent. 35
Campus speech codes are unlikely to fit under either of these
exceptions. In the first exception, a subclass of "fighting words"
may be prohibited if it is somehow a more extreme example of the
reason for the original creation of the category.36 University
administrators seeking to prohibit speech that involves overtones
of racial or sexual discrimination will be hard-pressed to show that
speech with those overtones is more likely to incite violence than
slurs without racial or sexual discriminatory overtones.37 The
Court's holding in R.A.V. supports this because it specifically
struck down an ordinance that attempted to differentiate among
"fighting words" on similar bases.'
For the second exception to apply, the administrators would
need to show that they were targeting some kind of "secondary
effects" and not the content of the speech itself. The hurt feelings
and psychological damage to those who hear the speech do not
suffice to qualify speech for this exception.
The Court has
explicitly stated that such effects are not "secondary effects."39
With these two narrow exceptions being the only avenues40
currently available to administrators attempting to limit speech,

33. Id. at 391.
34. Id. at 393 (writing "The First Amendment cannot be evaded that
easily.").
35. Id. at 388-89. The majority found that neither of these exceptions
applied to the Minnesota ordinance.
36. Id. at 389.
37. See Evan G.S. Siegel, Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression: The
Regulation of Offensive Speech at Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY L.J.
1351, 1365-70 (1990) (discussing some of the difficulties that university
administrators face in regulating speech).
38. Id. at 391.
39. Id. at 394 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988)). "The emotive
impact of speech on its audience is not a 'secondary effect.'" Id.
40. The Court will shortly address this issue again, in Black v.
Commonwealth of Virginia., 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001), cert. grantedsub nom.
Virginia v. Black, 535 U.S. 1094 (2002). The statute prohibited burning a
cross "with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons." VA.
CODE ANN. § 18,2-423 (Michie 2002). In Black, the Virginia Supreme Court
held that the statute was facially unconstitutional under the First

The John Marshall Law Review

[37:205

campus speech codes are not likely to survive the Court's
"underbreadth" test, even if aimed at "fighting words."
III. OVERBREADTH AND VAGUENESS: SPEECH CODES THAT
COVER EVERYTHING AND NOTHING

Content-based regulation is not the only stumbling block
faced by those who would institute campus speech codes. Another
crucial problem with campus speech codes is that they are both
overbroad and vague because the codes prohibit protected speech
as well as speech outside the protection of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Also, the exact language prohibited by
the codes can be hard to define, giving those students punished
under the codes little or no advance notice as to exactly what
speech has been prohibited.
Several Justices disagreed with the majority's rationale in
Instead of using the
R.A.V., but agreed with the result.4 1
"underbreadth" theory presented by the majority, these Justices
would have struck down the Minneapolis ordinance because it was
overbroad.42 In addition to prohibiting a narrow category of
"fighting words," the ordinance also prohibited "a substantial
amount of expression that, however repugnant, is shielded by the
Justice White reiterated the Court's longFirst Amendment."'
standing position that hurt feelings alone are not sufficient
grounds for removing First Amendment protection from speech."
The ordinance was "fatally overbroad and invalid on its face""
because so much protected speech was affected by the ordinance.
The overbreadth theory may make it nearly impossible to write a
campus speech code that would survive a constitutional challenge;
any such code needs to be extremely narrowly tailored to avoid
sweeping in protected, if "repugnant," speech.
Amendment. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard
oral arguments on December 11, 2002. As the Virginia Supreme Court
specifically cited to R.A.V. in striking down the statute, the Court may take
the opportunity, and in fact did so in 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1549 (2003) (stating that
the state may ban cross burning done with the intent to intimidate because
Virginia bans burning of crosses for many reasons).
41. 505 U.S. at 397.
42. Id. at 411 (White, J., concurring) (joined by Justices Blackmun,
O'Connor, and Stevens). Justice White further stated that the invention of the
new doctrine of "underbreadth" would unnecessarily confuse the lower federal
courts. Id. at 415.
43. See id. at 413 (noting that the case could be easily decided within the
contours of the "overbreadth" doctrine, and that invention of the
"underbreadth" doctrine would unnecessarily confuse the lower courts).
44. Id. at 414 ("[Sluch generalized reactions are not sufficient to strip
expression of its constitutional protection. The mere fact that expressive
activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the
expression unprotected").
45. Id.
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Federal district courts have cited to the overbreadth problem
when striking down campus speech codes. In Doe v. University of
Michigan,46 the district court declared the speech code adopted by
the University of Michigan to be unconstitutional.47 The court first
drew a distinction between "pure" speech and conduct, stating that
the latter was open to prohibition and punishment while speech
alone generally was not.4' The court went on to discuss the types
of speech that the university might be able to regulate, including
"fighting words" and speech "which has the effect of inciting
imminent lawless action." 9
Regulations aimed at prohibiting such speech must be
carefully targeted so it affects only the unprotected speech. If the
regulation also bans a significant amount of speech protected by
the First Amendment, the regulation is overbroad and cannot
withstand constitutional challenge. The Michigan speech code
was not so carefully targeted. Instead it prohibited both protected
speech and potentially unprotected speech." The University's code
vaguely described which types of speech were prohibited and the
administration never considered whether the speech complained of
might be protected by the First Amendment."1 The University
noted that speech that did violate the code included classroom
discussions on the origins of homosexuality" and informal

46. Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 868 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
47. Id. at 861. The speech code prohibited "behavior, verbal or physical,
that stigmatizes or victimizes ... on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex,
sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status,
handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status" when the behavior included a threat,
interfered with any aspect of university life, or created a hostile environment.
The code also had a largely identical section prohibiting "sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and verbal or physical conduct that stigmatizes or
victimizes.., on the basis of sex or sexual orientation."
Id. at 856.
48. See id. at 861-62 (citing the forms of discriminatory conduct that can be
and are regulated, including employment discrimination, assault, vandalism,
conspiracy to deprive others of constitutional rights, abduction, rape, and quid
pro quo sexual harassment. The court notes that the First Amendment would
not present an obstacle to regulating these forms of conduct).
49. See id. at 862-63 (noting, however, that the university may not prohibit
speech based on the content of the speech, or merely because the speech is
offensive or potentially offensive to some listeners).
See Part II, supra, for a discussion of content-based regulation of speech.
50. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 864.
51. Id. at 862-64.
52. See id. at 865 (stating his belief that homosexuality was a disease and
that he intended to establish a counseling program to cure gay individuals.
After several "heated discussions" on this subject, the student was summoned
to a hearing on the matter. The hearing panel found that the student was
guilty of sexual harassment but not harassment on the basis of sexual
orientation; there was no indication that the administration ever considered
the potential First Amendment protections for his statements).
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discussions about the challenges faced by dentistry students.'
Intense debate over the treatment of minorities in an academic
program or the reasons an individual is homosexual are not the
kind of speech contemplated by the "fighting words" doctrine.'
Yet those topics were exactly the kind of speech the university saw
as sufficiently harmful to warrant full hearings, counseling, and
forced apologies.55
Such an overbroad scope ensured the
unconstitutionality of the speech code because it conflicted with
the protections of the First Amendment.'
The district court also held that the Michigan speech code was
void for vagueness because it was not sufficiently clear to put
students on notice as to what was prohibited. 7 When a regulation
places limits on a constitutional right, the standards by which the
regulation will be applied must be even clearer.' The University
attempted to set the standards by noting that if the effects were to
"stigmatize" or "victimize" an individual, then such language was
not protected.
However, the general terms "stigmatize" and
"victimize" were held to be too vague to give students a clear
understanding of what was prohibited by the Michigan speech
code. 9 No clear standards for distinguishing between protected
and unprotected speech were ever established.'
Absent clear
standards as to what language was permissible and what was not
permissible, the court was unwilling to allow the university to
limit its students' First Amendment rights and found the code
unconstitutional.
In 1991, the Court struck down the speech code adopted by
the University of Wisconsin as unconstitutionally overbroad. 6
Wisconsin's speech code was created to prohibit the use of
demeaning language to create a hostile environment for other
students."
The district court, however, held that the code
53. See id. at 865-66 (stating "he had heard that minorities had a difficult
time in the course and that he had heard that they were not treated fairly." In
response to a complaint about this statement, the student was "counseled"
regarding the speech code and required to make a written apology for the

statement).
54. Id. at 862.
55. See supra notes 52-53.
56. Id. at 866.
57. Id. at 867.
58. Id. at 866 (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974)).
59. See id. at 867 (stating "[b]oth of these terms are general and elude
precise definition").

60. Id. at 867.
61. UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1181 (E.D. Wis.
1991).
62. Id. at 1165. Specifically, the code prohibited speech that: (1) was racist
or discriminatory; (2) was directed at an individual; (3) was demeaning on the
basis of race, sex, etc.; and (4) created a hostile environment for the targeted

student. Id. at 1166.
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prohibited more speech than was permissible and that the
restricted speech went beyond the "fighting words" exception.'
"Fighting words" only includes those words that have a tendency
to incite a violent reaction, and the Wisconsin code attempted to
regulate speech regardless of the possibility for violence.'
Any
psychological or emotional harm suffered by the listener was not a
sufficient reason to prohibit the speech in question.' The broad
scope of the Wisconsin speech code included enough protected
speech that the district court held it was unconstitutionally
overbroad.'
The code's failure to differentiate intent from effect was also a
concern for the district court. First, the court held that the phrase
"discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive behavior"
was not vague but was "clear and definite in the context of the
phrase and the rule." 7 The court also found that the term
"demean" was not vague in the context of the rule.' However, the
court held that the standards for determining when speech was
prohibited were ambiguous.' The court held that the code did not
make clear "whether the regulated speech must actually demean
the listener and create an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning
environment for education, or whether the speaker must merely70
intend to demean the listener and create such an environment."
Regardless of the interpretation of the standard, the code retained
its overbroad scope and, therefore, the court refused to interpret
the speech code.7
These two cases remain the only two challenges to campus
speech codes in federal court. In both cases, the district courts
63. Id. at 1172. Speech punished by the university included one white
student telling an Asian student that "It's people like you, that's the reason
this country is screwed up" and "you don't belong here"; one male student was
punished for yelling "you've got nice tits" at a female student. Other punished
incidents involving at least an element of speech included harassment of a

Turkish-American

student by another student pretending to be an

immigration official and the theft and use of a Japanese student's bank card.
Id. at 1167-68. While these comments and actions are reprehensible, they do
not rise to the level of "fighting words." Id. at 1173.

64. Id. at 1172-73.
65. Id. at 1172 n.7. "[Sipeech does not lose its protected status merely
because it inflicts injury or disgrace onto its addressees." Id.
66. Id. at 1177. The court also briefly examined a parallel between the
speech code and Title VII's hostile environment provision. The court stated
that such an analogy was not appropriate for three reasons: the speech code
does not regulate an employment setting; students are not agents for the
university as employees can be for an employer, and a statute such as Title
VII cannot supercede the First Amendment. Id.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 1179.
Id. at 1180.
Id. at 1180-81.
Id. at 1180.
Id. at 1181.
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struck down the codes as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
This track record does not bode well for public university
administrators who seek to protect their campus and students by
limiting student speech. The speech that administrators want to
prohibit through speech codes is difficult to precisely define. If the
code covers too much speech, the courts are likely to find that the
If the code covers too little speech,
code is overbroad.
administrators are unlikely to achieve their goal of a safer campus
because much of the speech they seek to prohibit will be allowed.
If the speech code seeks to be undefined enough to cover all the
speech the administrators find harmful, the courts are likely to
find that the code is unconstitutionally vague. If speech codes can
be written in a way that satisfies both the Constitution and the
goal of a safe and supportive campus, the road to such a code is a
narrow one indeed.
IV. CAMPUS SPEECH CODES: RESTRICTIONS IN THE LEAST LIKELY
PLACES

Beyond the legal restrictions, the unique setting presented by
the university can present further problems with instituting
speech codes aimed at preventing "undesirable" speech.
Universities are seen as places where a free exchange of ideas can
Restrictions on speech through the
and should take place.
adoption of speech codes can hamper the free exchange of ideas, at
least when the ideas at issue may be offensive to some parties.
The university setting can be further divided into two main areas:
inside the classroom (where some restrictions on speech may be
permissible to maintain order) and outside the classroom.
A. Speech Codes and Academic Freedom
One area in which universities have attempted to regulate
speech is inside the classroom. To protect the minority students
attending class, universities have placed limits on what professors
and other students may say in the context of a class. These limits
are aimed at preventing the creation of a hostile learning
environment for students, in particular minorities. The unique
setting of the classroom, where the professor stands as an
authority figure and the students are arguably a captive audience,
suggests that a higher level of speech restriction may be possible."2
A number of questions arise when considering academic
freedom in the classroom setting such as (1) how closely tied to
"legitimate" academic goals must potentially offensive language be
72. See William Shawn Alexander, Regulating Speech on Campus: A Plea
for Tolerance, WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1349, 1358 (1991) (discussing that such
restriction might well fall under a "time, place, manner" restriction and
therefore be upheld as constitutional if not overly sweeping).
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to gain protection; (2) the definition of "legitimate" goals; (3)
whether isolated instances of offensive speech sufficient to garner
sanctions or, conversely, whether an ongoing pattern of
discrimination must be shown? A delicate balance must be
maintained to preserve the free exchange of ideas, even offensive
ideas, as well as a learning environment that does not alienate
certain individuals. 3 The Supreme Court has spoken firmly about
the need to preserve academic freedom in American classrooms:
"[Academic] freedom is ... a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
'The vigilant protection of
orthodoxy over the classroom.
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools.' The classroom is peculiarly the
'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas
which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of74tongues, [rather] than
through any kind of authoritative selection.
This cherished academic freedom is not, however, the only
value at issue in the classroom. Two recent appellate cases
discussed the tension created between the First Amendment rights
of professors to speak freely in class and the university's desire to
provide a learning environment free from discriminatory language.
Both cases involved alleged sexually harassing behavior by
professors in the classroom. In Bonnell v. Lorenzo,75 Bonnell, a
professor at a community college, was accused of creating a hostile
environment for women in his classes for allegedly using obscene
language, lewd and sexually explicit comments, and stories with
sexual innuendoes."6 Bonnell also circulated a paper discussing
After the college brought
the allegations against him.77
disciplinary action against Bonnell, he sued the college, claiming
73. See generally NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME - BUT NOT FOR
THEE: How THE AMERICAN LEFT AND RIGHT RELENTLESSLY CENSOR EACH

OTHER, 114 (1993). Yale professor Donald Kagen writes:
Freedom of speech is vital, but it is not free; it has a high price.

It

compels us to go against our natures, to hear unpleasant and even
hateful things, to tolerate unpleasant and even hateful people. It
requires us to take stem measures against our own, and even ourselves.

Id.
74. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). The Court struck
down a New York law that allowed a university to fire a professor for refusing
to sign a statement certifying that he was not a Communist and noting that
there is a corollary relationship between the importance of preventing violence
and the imperative to protect free speech. Id. at 602.
75. Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2001).
76. Id. at 803-05 (detailing several students' complaints about Professor
Bonnell).
77. Id. at 805. Bonnell distributed his paper, An Apology: Yes, Virginia,
There is a Sanity Clause, along with copies of the complaint against him to
more than two hundred faculty members at the community college.
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that his speech was protected by the First Amendment.
Justice Clay of the Sixth Circuit noted the conflict between
promoting a free exchange of ideas on a college campus and
ensuring an environment free from sexual harassment.78 The
court held that the First Amendment protected the paper Bonnell
had distributed, but the use of profanity during his classes was not
protected.7 '
Noting that the language used by Bonnell was
constitutionally protected, the court went on to hold that he did
not have the "constitutional right to use [it] in a classroom setting
where they are not germane to the subject matter." ° The captive
audience in Bonnell's classroom, combined with the college's
sexual harassment policy, prohibited him from using language
that created a hostile environment for his students and did not
advance his educational goals."' The court concluded that each use
of language that may rise to the level of sexual harassment must
be evaluated on its own merits, balancing the concerns of academic
freedom for the professor with the college's interest in maintaining
a hostility-free learning environment. 2
First Amendment concerns were also at issue in Vega v.
Miller.s' Professor Edward Vega taught a remedial composition
class. 4 During one session of the class, he led a "free-association"
exercise in which students were to call out words related to a
topic.8' The students selected "sex" as their topic and eventually
called out a number of potentially offensive words and phrases. 8
The college terminated Vega's employment, citing his use of
sexually explicit language and sexual themes in the classroom. 7
Vega sued the college, stating that the college had violated his
academic freedom and First Amendment rights. 8 The college
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 810.
Id. at 821.
Id. at 820-21.
Id. The court noted that a free exchange of ideas, even controversial

ones, should still be encouraged in college classrooms. Profanity simply does

not hold the same constitutional protection and can therefore be limited in this
setting. The court seemed to focus on the fact that Bonnell's students could
not just "avert their [ears]" to avoid the profanity. Id.

82. Id. at 823-24. In this instance, the court held that this balance tipped
narrowly in favor of the college, given the specific facts of the case.
83. Vega v. Miller, 273 F.3d 460 (2d Cir. 2001).

84. Id. at 462.
85. Id. The students were then to group the words in "clusters." The
purpose of the exercise was to help students learn to be less repetitive with

their word choices.
86. Id. at 463. The students started with words such as "marriage" and
"children," but progressed to vulgar phrases referring both to the sexual act
and to male and female genitalia. Id. None of the students ever complained
about the exercise, but the college became aware of it through an investigation

of another matter. Id.
87. Id.
88. Vega, 273 F. 3d at 464.
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claimed qualified immunity "on the ground that the law
concerning Vega's claims was not clearly established [when the
college terminated his contract]."" The Second Circuit held that
the college could reasonably have believed that it was not violating
Vega's First Amendment rights, given the state of the law
concerning academic freedom. ° While the court refused to
specifically decide whether the college's actions were unlawful, it
did hold that the incident in Vega's classroom was unnecessary
and unrelated to his legitimate academic goals.91
The outcomes in these cases suggest that courts will pay
special attention to the "captive audience" that professors have in
their classrooms when evaluating claims of academic freedom.
The conflict with the desire to protect students from offensive
speech may be resolved on the issue of what constitutes a
"legitimate" academic goal.9"
The issue of what goals are
"legitimate" has yet to be resolved and will present a difficult
challenge if and when courts address it. Some limits, however, are
likely to be permissible in the classroom setting, even if they are
restricted to the most outrageous and offensive speech that lack
academic merit. Administrators and courts must take care,
however, that the limits do not unduly restrict academic ideas and
speech solely because they might offend someone.93 Furthermore,
these cases indicate there may be a significant distinction between
university speech codes that address student speech inside the
classroom versus outside the classroom, and codes that address
the speech of professors.
B. An Equal PlayingField? Speech Outside the Classroom
Student speech outside the classroom setting presents a more
difficult situation for university regulation. The concern over a
89. Id.
90. Id. at 468.
91. Id. Judge Cabranes, in dissent, would have denied qualified immunity
to the defendants on the grounds that, inter alia, the sexual harassment policy
was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Id.at 480.
92. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487, 491 (1980) (holding that the
First Amendment allows the government to censor objectionable speech when
a captive audience cannot avoid it in order to serve a legitimate goal).

93. See, e.g., National Public Radio: All Things Considered (NPR radio
broadcast,
Sept.
10,
2002),
available
at
http://www.thefire.orgfissues/nprll0902.php3 (last visited Sept. 10, 2003).
Professor Berthold, in reaction to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and Pentagon, made an off-the-cuff remark: "Anybody who blows up
the Pentagon gets my vote." The comment led quickly to angry phone calls
and emails, death threats, and a university investigation of Professor

Berthold. He was allowed to retain his position, but is now prohibited from
teaching freshman history. Other professors at other universities were also
denounced for asking their classes critical questions about Muslims, Israel,
and the United States' Middle East policy in the days following the attacks.
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"captive audience" that plays such a large role in the classroom
setting is not present, nor do students have the same power over
one another that a professor can exert. With these countervailing
interests removed, the interest in a free and robust exchange of
ideas holds even greater influence. 4 Universities have little
legitimate interest in sanitizing and unifying the viewpoints held
outside the classroom and on campus simply to avoid hurting
anyone's feelings." Therefore universities have less justification
for imposing speech codes outside the classroom.9
Even the best intentions can lead university administrators
astray. In 1975, Yale University adopted the Woodward Report, a
report emphasizing the importance of free speech in the university
setting.97 The report acknowledged the need to strive for equality
on campus, but placed free speech as a higher value, "a vital,
indispensable need for a free university.""8 Ironically, Yale became
the setting for a free speech conflict just a little over a decade after
the Report had been adopted. Wayne Dick, a Yale undergraduate
student, posted flyers around campus that parodied an upcoming
gay and lesbian awareness week.' While the text of the flyers was
not legally obscene or defamatory, it offended many people at
Yale. 100
While Dick had published the flyer anonymously, the person
who had copied the flyer for him eventually identified him. °1 Dick
received a letter from an associate dean, notifying him that a
complaint had been filed about the posters, that a committee had
decided the complaint had merit, and that the case would be
submitted to the Yale College Executive Committee.' 2 This
94. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972) (noting that "[tihe
College, acting here as the instrumentality of the State, may not restrict
speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by any group
to be abhorrent").
95. See HENTOFF, supra note 73, at 116 (quoting Professor Kagan as

saying:
Shock, hurt, and anger are not consequences to be weighed lightly. No
member of the community with a decent respect for others should use,

or encourage others to use, slurs and epithets intended to discredit
another's race, ethnic group, religion, or sex. [Yet] it may sometimes be
necessary in a university for civility and mutual respect to be
superceded by the need to guarantee free expression).

96. Id.
97. Id. at 117.
98. Id. (citing C. Vann Woodward, Chair of the Woodward Report).

99. Id. at 118-19.

The flyers advertised a fictitious event called "BAD

Week" and was inspired by the real event, "GLAD" (Gay and Lesbian
Awareness Days). Id. at 119.

100. Id.
101. HENTHOFF, supra note 73, at 119.

102. Id. at 121. Dick was informed that he might have violated a university
regulation that prohibited "[pihysical restriction, assault, coercion, or
intimidation of any member of the community... [including] any act of
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committee "conducted their proceedings in secret [and] issued no
written opinions or... even a count of the final vote."" 3 Dick
wrote a letter to this committee, as he was requested to do,
asserting that the Report protected his flier." The committee
disagreed.
Wayne Dick was told that his flyer was "worthless speech"
and therefore not protected.0 5 He was found guilty of violating the
university's regulations and was placed on two years of
probation.' If he committed a "serious offense" (a term which was
never defined) while on probation, he would be suspended or
expelled." ' His probationary status would also be noted on his
transcript and in any letters of recommendation sent by the
university or his professors."n When Dick wrote the president of
Yale, asking for an explanation of what would constitute a "serious
offense," the reply he received was not enlightening."° He was told
that the university felt his freedom of expression was important
and that his "right to free expression of opinions, on any issue,
[would] be protected by the University in the future as it [had]
been in the past.""0 Apparently, "any issue" meant any issue on
which Dick's views aligned with the accepted views on campus.
Wayne Dick's story illustrates what can happen when
university administrators try to censor speech based on the
unpopularity of the views being expressed. While Yale decided
several months later to reverse its decision about Dick's flyer, he
was still subjected to harassment, a secret trial, and a vague and
ominous punishment, simply because he expressed a view counter
to the accepted norm on campus."'
The Supreme Court has a long-standing commitment to the
idea that diversity of opinion should be welcomed in educational
settings, even if some of those opinions may be unpopular or even
offensive." ' Especially outside of the classroom, where students
harassment, intimidation, coercion, or assault, or any other act of violence
against any member of the community, including sexual, racial, or ethnic
harassment." Id. (citing Chapter I, Section B, pages 6-7 of the Yale College
regulations).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 122.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 123-24.
107. HENTHOFF, supra note 73, at 124.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 124-26.
110. Id. at 125-26 (citing the letter from Yale's president to Wayne Dick).
111. Id. at 129. The decision was only reversed after C. Vann Woodward,
the author of the Woodward Report, became Dick's advocate on this issue. The
reversal was not uniformly welcomed; representatives of minority groups on
campus pointed to the decision as an example of minority issues not being
taken seriously. Id. at 129-30.
112. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
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may feel more free to express themselves without fear of official
academic repercussions, university administrators should be
extremely cautious before moving to silence that expression."
Despite the excellent intentions of those involved," free speech
cannot and should not be trammeled in the name of student
equality."'
C. Sexual Harassment:Special Circumstances?
Sexual harassment, in the context of campus speech codes,
presents an additional problem. Many expressions relating to sex
are, even if offensive, not actionable. "6 Much of the sexual speech
that occurs on a college campus is consensual and not harassment.
508-09 (1969) (noting that "[a]ny variation from the majority's opinion may
inspire fear. Any word spoken.., that deviates from the views of another
person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution
says we must take this risk ...and our history says that it is this sort of
hazardous freedom... that is the basis of our national strength and of the
independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively
permissive, often disputatious, society." (citing Terminiello v. City of Chicago,
377 U.S. 1, 2 (1949))). See also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 641 (1943) (stating "[clompulsory unification of opinion achieves only the
unanimity of the graveyard.").
113. See Debra J. Saunders, Academia's Swindle, THE S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 13,
2002). (demonstrating that students in positions of power must also take care
not to unduly burden their fellow students' rights). At the University of
California at Berkeley, the student senate voted to raise the school
newspaper's rent unless it "printed an apology for the cartoon [dealing with
the terrorist attacks of 9/111 and adopted 'voluntary diversity training."' Id.
The Student Senate said "they didn't want to suppress differing viewpoints,
but that for the public good, it was their duty to prevent speech that is racist,
divisive or likely to lead to violence." Id.
114. See, e.g., Caleros supra note 2, at 1274-75 (noting that how "excellent"
those intentions [of the administrators] are has been questioned, especially in
the time since the two federal courts struck down campus speech codes).
University administrators may be aware that speech codes will not pass the
constitutional test, but enact them regardless to satisfy vocal groups on
campus calling for a sanitizing of campus speech. Id. Alternatively, they may
not care that the codes are unconstitutional, enacting them with the
expectation that no student will actually bring the constitutional challenge
needed to strike them down. Calleros quotes a university administrator on
regulating speech: "I believe in pushing for discipline of the speaker in such a
case, regardless of the legal problems. Our action might get struck down as
unconstitutional, but at least we'll go down swinging, and the students will
know that we went to bat for them." Id. at 1274.
115. SMOLLA, supra note 11, at 169. Smolla summarized it well: "In a just
society, reason and tolerance must triumph over prejudice and hate. But that
triumph is best achieved though education, not coercion. Tolerance should be
a dominant voice in the marketplace of ideas, but it should not preempt that
marketplace." Id.
116. Few would argue that a single request for a date, a bawdy joke, or an
admiring comment aimed at an attractive fellow student should constitute the
grounds for disciplinary action. Yet a speech code drawn too broadly might
well encompass these and other similarly innocuous speech.
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On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine any speech that is
considered harassment on racial or ethnic grounds being
consensual. This situation raises the question of how to determine
when sexual speech has become harassing and not "merely"
offensive and therefore punishable under a speech code. After all,
"one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."117 Proponents of campus
speech codes must also struggle with the issue of whether sexual
speech alone can cross the line into harassment.
One possible dividing line for determining when sexual
comments become harassing is the "unwelcomeness" standard
used in the Title VII context. Under Title VII, the Supreme Court
has held that part of the standard for whether actions rise to the
level of sexual harassment is whether the actions were unwelcome
to the recipient."8 Unwelcomeness, however, can be a difficult
quality to determine. At some level, it becomes a question of
subjectivity or objectivity: if the recipient of the action did not
demonstrate to the alleged harasser that his or her actions were
unwelcome, were they actually welcome? Or must the internal
thoughts of the recipient be considered in evaluating the actions,
even if he or she did not in any way convey those thoughts? The
entire situation surrounding the alleged sexual harassment will be
examined in an attempt to answer the question of whether the
actions were welcome or not. The burden is placed on the plaintiff
in a Title VII case; he or she must show that the actions of the
alleged harasser were not welcome. 9 While it may seem harsh to
force the alleged victim to prove that he or she did not welcome the
conduct, this standard avoids punishing individuals for conduct
they may not have known was perceived as harassment.
Later Title VII cases have tried to further define
"unwelcomeness." In Burn v. McGregor,2 ' the court found that...
[wielcomeness cannot necessarily be assumed because of the
recipient's own prior actions, such as "use of foul language or
sexual innuendo in a consensual setting." 21 However, evidence of
the recipient's "willing and welcome" participation in the actions
at issue can be used to show that the actions were welcome, at

117. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). The Court was examining
the difficulty of determining what speech is "offensive" and therefore affected
by the California statute at issue. The Court noted that "[slurely the State
has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically
palatable to the most squeamish among us." Id.
118. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
119. See, e.g., Burns v. McGregor, 989 F.2d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 1993) (listing
elements of plaintiffs burden of proof).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 963. See also Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir.
1987) (stating that one's previous actions do not establish that allegedly
harassing conduct is welcome).
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least at the time they were carried out.'22 The court can evaluate
the recipient's "words, deeds,
and deportment" to determine if the
123
conduct was welcomed.
This "unwelcomeness" standard might provide some guidance
if university administrators insist on attempting to regulate
student speech, especially sexual speech.2
If speech is to be
prohibited, it must be clear that the speech falls outside First
Amendment protection.
The more objective standard of
"unwelcomeness", examining the entire situation to determine
if
the recipient welcomed the speech, might help clarify when sexual
speech is and is not protected. If the speech is only borderline
offensive, so that only the recipient of the speech "knows" it is
offensive, administrators will have a harder time enforcing a
speech code that bans that speech. The inherent vagueness in
prohibiting
speech offensive
to
the listener
prevents
administrators from clearly defining what speech will be
prohibited, exposing the code to a (most likely successful)
constitutional challenge for vagueness.
In addition to the difficulty faced in dividing welcome from
unwelcome sexual speech, proponents of speech codes face another
difficult question: is speech alone enough? A number of speech
code supporters have suggested that speech is enough because
speech can cause sufficient harm and therefore it should be
regulated."'

122. Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 491 (7th Cir. 1991). The Seventh
Circuit held that the plaintiff had welcomed a wide variety of conduct from her
co-workers, therefore failing to state a claim of sexual harassment. This
conduct included sexual jokes and innuendo, having her head forcibly placed
in a co-worker's lap, having a cattle prod placed between her legs, being
handcuffed to a toilet, and being maced. Id. at 486.
123. Carr v. Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 1994). The
court found that the co-workers' conduct was unwelcome despite the plaintiffs
own "unladylike" behavior. Id.
124. The standard from Title VII cases is unlikely to be imported directly to
campus speech code cases because of several key differences. For students,
the university is not an employment setting, and students are not agents of
the university in the same way that employees may be considered agents of
the employer. The "unwelcomeness" standard from Title VII might, however,
provide a starting point for speech code cases.
125. In fact, some universities have decided that sexual harassment can
occur without even speech. At the University of Nevada-Las Vegas Law
School, a student was disciplined for viewing the Maxim website, a men's
magazine, on his laptop computer while on a class break. Two female
students looked over his shoulder at the screen and were offended by what
they saw. The students complained to their professor and the male student
was asked to attend a diversity awareness seminar and write an email
apologizing for his conduct. If he did not, he would face formal charges from
the law school. See Steve Sebelius, Editorial, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL
Oct. 10, 2002, at 9b (defending the student's First Amendment right to view
the web page).
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The Supreme Court, however, has strongly suggested that
speech alone will not be enough in the Title VII setting (and, by
extension, in the speech code setting). 2 ' The Court has stated that
some speech, such as sexually harassing speech, may be regulated
because it is "swept up incidentally" with the regulation of
conduct.'27 This regulation is only possible in situations in which
"the government does not target conduct on the basis of its
Speech alone, without accompanying
expressive content." 28
discriminatory or harassing conduct, may be beyond the
regulatory power of state actors.
As the constantly shifting definition of "unwelcomeness" in
the Title VII setting shows, it can be extremely difficult to
separate consensual sexual conduct from non-consensual,
harassing conduct. That line becomes more crucial, yet harder, to
draw when the "conduct" is solely speech. A standard that both
preserves the First Amendment rights of students and protects
those students from sexually harassing speech is hard to imagine.
Students should not be punished for speech protected by the First
Amendment. In Title VII cases and perhaps in speech code cases,
the Court seems ready to define sexual harassment as, at a
minimum, speech plus some conduct.
V.

CONCLUSION

Campus speech codes present numerous problems for public
universities. These codes tend to be overbroad, trying to eliminate
any potentially offensive speech from the campus. The broad
sweep of these codes keeps them from surviving a constitutional
challenge. The codes also are, of some necessity, vague. It is
probably impossible for a university to list all types of speech
prohibited by such a code; however, conversely, when prohibited
speech is not specified the codes are unconstitutional. These two
barriers to speech codes, overbreadth and vagueness, create a
narrow definition of what a constitutional speech code is and
illustrates the difficulty posed by the creation of such codes.
First, who decides what is offensive? If the majority decides,
unpopular speech may be censored simply for being out of favor."9
If the minority decides, speech that seems innocent to the majority
may, unexpectedly, be found to be offensive and therefore

126. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389-90.
127. Id. at 389.
128. Id. at 390.
129. Consider, for example, Wayne Dick's signs. In an earlier time, the
posters would have represented the dominant view toward homosexuality on
most campuses and would likely have gone unnoticed, or at least unpunished.
Now that views have changed, his now minority view is singled out by the
administration for punishment.
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punishable."'
Second, even if university administrators could silence
expression that is unpopular or offensive, should they? The usual
justification for campus speech codes is that the university is
attempting to preserve an equal playing field for its students, one
in which all students feel safe and supported in their academic
pursuits. But is this protection really needed? This theory
assumes that certain students cannot survive hearing verbal
attacks on their religion, race, gender, sexuality or ethnicity. Such
an assumption insults those who are able to hear this offensive
speech without suffering the permanent, crippling psychological
wounds that they are told are inevitable."'
Finally, sanitizing campus speech to eliminate "offensive"
comments fails to address the underlying problems.'32 Driving
racist, sexist, and other discriminatory speech underground will
not necessarily eliminate a student's thoughts and emotions. In
fact, students who come to campus holding such beliefs may feel
persecuted by the university's edict forbidding those beliefs, or at
least, their expression, and may therefore cling more tightly to
them than if they had been permitted to voice their opinion. It
could result in physical, potentially violent expressions that would
otherwise be verbal. Allowing those views to be aired also gives
opponents the opportunity to engage in counterspeech, exposing
the weaknesses of the offensive views and providing a much better
opportunity
to challenge or change a student's underlying
133
beliefs.
The struggle over free speech continues at universities today.
In addition to speech codes, some universities have adopted "free
130. See, e.g., Dale Russakoff, Penn Women Drop Racial Charge, THE WASH.
POST, May 25, 1993, at A3 (describing a situation where a University of
Pennsylvania student risked expulsion for calling several black female

students "water buffaloes"). While he insisted the term was insulting but not
racially-derogatory, the university chose to believe the black students who
insisted it was a racial epithet. The black students eventually dropped their
charges against the male student, claiming that the media was biased against
them and that they could not receive a fair hearing on their charges.
131. See generally Bryan Christopher Adams, Shouting Epithets on a
Crowded Campus-A Lesson in Tolerating Intolerance, 44 ALA. L. REV. 157,
174-75 (1992) (discussing the potentially stigmatizing effect of speech codes).

132. Id. at 171-73. Some commentators have suggested that the move toward
promoting equality on campus at the expense of free speech may have created
an atmosphere where an open discussion of the lingering problems of racism,
sexism, and other forms of discrimination cannot take place.
133. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 72, at 1349 (expressing the fear that
speech codes will prevent educated individuals from "rais[ing] the level of

public discourse about topics like race, gender, and human sexuality");
Calleros, supra note 2, at 1256-63 (discussing the efficacy of counterspeech);
Benjamin Thompson, U. Wisconsin Betrays Both Campus Climate, Free
Speech, U-WIRE, May 8, 2002 (explaining the need of free speech in campus

settings).

20031

Sticks and Stones

speech zones."'34 In these zones, students and other protesters are
free to express themselves on any issue they choose. After
creating these zones, the universities then use them as leverage to
justify limiting speech on other parts of the campus.'
These "free
speech zones" have not yet been challenged in court, but they are
as unlikely to withstand constitutional challenge as are speech
codes.
Donna Shalala, as Chancellor of the University of
Wisconsin in 1988, spoke about universities and the First
Amendment:
The First Amendment is not something that we can honor when we
choose and disregard when we do not like what we hear... freedom
is never easy, and a great university is not a place to play with
constitutional rights. It is a laboratory for open debate, a haven for
diverse opinions. It must be a special place where those rights are
protected and where principles of freedom are taught to citizens...
[U] niversity administrators cannot abandon those principles to
satisfy the will of a few, or even of many, at the expense of civil
rights guaranteed to us all.' 3
A robust exchange of ideas, even offensive, sometimes hurtful
ideas, is a central part of the learning and intellectual exploration
essential on university campuses. While preserving civility on
campuses is a noble goal, it is a goal that must take second place
to the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment.
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(discussing the implementation of free speech zones on college campuses).
135. Some administrators justify the zones with a claim of public safety.
See, e.g., College students protest against so-called free speech zones at their
campuses, saying that they violate their First Amendment rights, (NPR:
Morning edition radio broadcast, Apr. 26, 2002 (citing West Virginia
University President David Hardesty).
136. Kiki Jameson, Paved With Good Intentions: The University of Wisconsin
Speech Code, HATE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 171 (citing WISCONSIN STATE
JOURNAL, Nov. 13, 1988, at 18A).

